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Bounty systems in vermin control
". . . almost total lack of success, usually accompanied by frauds"

Simon Whitehouse
Agriculture Protection Board of
Western Australia
For more than 3 000 years man
has tried to reduce the numbers of
pest animals by payment of bounties.
In general, the system has failed.
This article, by a research scientist
who specializes in the study of declared (pest) animals in Western
Australia reviews some of the literature about bounties and comments
on the situation in Australia.
It concludes that the arguments in
favour of bounty systems for animal
population management are extremely
hard to justify, and little evidence of
the operation of any successful bounty
system can be found.
Bounty systems appear to be
counter-productive in terms of alleviating the problems caused by
pest animals. As a means of rural
subsidy they are illogical.
"Bonus" or "bounty" systems
may be defined as the payment of
rewards to hunters for the killing of
animals regarded as pests. The
systems are intended to control animals that either compete with, or are

injurious to, man's interests. The
most frequent targets are predators.
Such programmes have been in
operation around the world for
about 3 000 years.
The ancient
Greeks paid bounties on wolves (1)
and, since then, bounties have been
paid on a wide variety of animals.
These have ranged from predators of
stock—wolves, bears, dingoes, etc.—
through to such animals as emus,
seals, crows, mountain lions, squirrels and porcupines, and the reasons
why the bounties have been offered
are varied.
It is difficult to find in the literature
any documented cases which report
the successful use of the bounty
system. The little support that can
be found appears to consist of
letters and articles in non-technical
journals, based largely on opinions
rather than facts.
In the United States, bounties date
back to 1683 (2) when the State of
Pennsylvania introduced bounties to
control predators of game. Since
then all American States have, at
various times, inaugurated similar
programmes. Most States still use
bounty systems.
In colonial America, tobacco was a
medium of exchange and was used

as the bonus payment. Today money
is the usual payment, although other
valuable tender, such as livestock,
has been used.
Jacobsen (3) carried out a comprehensive survey of the various systems
that have operated in the United
States. In reviewing the basic requirements of any scheme, he quotes
from an 1896 report of the United
States Department of Agriculture.
Dr. T. S. Palmer, at that time First
Assistant in the U.S. Biological
Surveys, stated:
Any scheme intended to bring
about the extermination of a
species must fulfil certain conditions before it can prove successful in practice:
• It must be applied over a wide
area, practically covering the range
of the species, otherwise the animal
will increase in the unprotected
region.
• It should be uniform (that is,
the rates should be the same) in all
localities.
• It should provide some inducement for carrying out its provisions.
• It should be economical, for, if
expensive, the cost will exceed the
losses which it seeks to avert.
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• It should provide, so far as is
possible, against fraud or the misappropriation of public funds.
Hamilton (4) enumerated another
requirement, that "theoretically, a
bounty must be high enough to
ensure the destruction of at least a
majority of the individuals during
the first bounty season".
From a model simulating coyote
population dynamics Connolly and
Longhurst (5) determined that if the
annual kill was 75 per cent., the
population could be exterminated
in slightly more than 50 years. However when they studied the data from
a county in California, they concluded the coyote numbers were not
being reduced at all; instead, the
reproduction rate was being locally
stimulated.
The problems facing the use of
bonus payments to control animal
numbers are large. Fairley (6) described the central problem as being
two-fold:
• The payment must be large
enough to induce a kill in one season which is appreciably larger
than that caused by the natural
mortality factors.
• If the initial reduction is
achieved the hunting of the smaller
numbers requires more effort and,
unless greater and greater bounties
are paid, equilibrium is reached or
the species is allowed to move to
its original level. Alternatively,
the hunters, whose interests are
concerned, will ensure that the
animal is not exterminated.
Jacobsen discussed many systems
that have been evolved, and the
theme is generally one of almost
total lack of success, usually accompanied by frauds. As soon as the
monetary incentive becomes high
enough to satisfy the first criterion
above, frauds of two basic kinds
occur.
The first is caused by the nonuniform payment of bonuses in
different areas. This results in the
movement of scalps or other proofs
of destruction from areas of low or
no bonus, to areas of high bonus payments.
The second type of fraud consists
of the substitution of the scalp of an
animal of no bonus value for that of
an animal on which the bonus is
being paid.

The Michigan Department of Conservation reported as follows in 1922:
The history of the Michigan bounty
law on predacious things is dotted
with the work of those who
padded bounty orders, manufactured woodchuck scalps by
sewing ears on pieces of pelts,
collected bounty on house-cats
claiming them to be "wild-cats",
of substituting blackbird heads for
baby crow heads; of claimants
stealing from township clerks the
once bountied and discarded scalps
and heads; of others who purchased Wisconsin weasel, where no
bounty is paid, and collected a
bounty in Michigan on them,
falsely swearing they had been
captured in this State.
One of the most amazing frauds
must be that cited by Hamilton where
a payment of a bonus of $50 on a
wolf scalp in the New York State
was made in 1947. There had been
no authentic record of a wolf in that
State since around the turn of the
century.
"Bonuses, in themselves, have
not been responsible for the
satisfactory control of any
predator population"
But the possibility of fraud occurring is by no means the main drawback of the bounty systems. Bonuses,
in themselves, have not been responsible/or the satisfactory control of any
predator population.
The Pennsylvania Game Commission paid a bounty on weasels for
over half a century and, at the end of
that time, the largest number of
weasels during the history of the
bounty were being presented annually
for payment.
In Minnesota, a 12-year bounty
period for foxes yielded evidence of a
steady rise in the fox population. At
first 25 000 were killed per year, but
this rose steadily to 40 000.
The payment of bounties on
squirrels in Great Britain appears to
have had no effect on the population.
Wolves and coyote populations in
Ontario appear to be totally
unaffected by the payment of bonuses^. 8).
The bounty does not appear to
have had any effect on the mountain
lion population in California(9).

Virginia encouraged the killing of
wolves almost from the date of its
first settlement and has, at times,
paid $25 each for their scalps. However wolves in that State were not
exterminated until the Civil War
period, after the rewards had been in
force for more than two centuries.
Even then, their extermination was
not because of the bounty, but
rather through the settlement of the
State(lO).
Probably the most detailed examination of any bounty system was
carried out by Fairley, when he
examined the Northern Ireland system of fox control. He concluded
that the only fox "predator" was man
and that, by a variety of methods, a
large number of foxes were killed
each year. He believed that this
hunting, whether bounty-inspired or
otherwise, did not make any substantial long-term difference to the
population. The reasons were:
• If the bounty is affecting foxes
in N. Ireland, it is curious that it
is maintaining them at a more or
less constant level without reducing them further. When bounties
were
suspended
in
certain
countries, there was no sign of an
increase in the animals.
• There are many areas where
foxes are not hunted, often because
they are remote or inaccessible or
no-one bothers to hunt them.
• Statistical analysis of the
bounty figures tends to suggest that
the numbers of foxes caught in
winter and early summer bear no
relation to the numbers caught
next winter.
• It can be concluded that less,
possibly much less than 33 percent
of adults are killed by man and
very much less than 44 per cent
of the cubs.
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Fairley concluded that the bounty
"is of no value in keeping down
foxes". The major mortality factor
was disease, and even though a large
number of deaths may be attributed to the bounty, many of the
foxes killed by man would have died
anyway due to natural causes. No
additional mortality was being added
to the pre-existing natural mortality.
This point is often missed by
advocates of the bounty system, who
maintain that by killing many individuals, they must be reducing the
population. Mech(ll) reports on
studies where the natural mortality
in the wolf populations in their first
year of life is 50 to 70 per cent, and
this may run even higher.
From the evidence cited above,
there seems little doubt that the
bonus system as a means of reducing
predator populations has not been
effective. Jacobsen states:
At no time in our 30 years of
direct and indirect association with
predatory animal control have we
encountered any bounty payment
plan which, of itself, has successfully brought about the reduction
of predators when and where
needed.
Apparently, the ideal
bounty system has yet to be
devised which, through proper and
periodic upward adjustments of
payments, commensurate with the
scarcity of the animals to be
controlled, will continue to induce
hunters or trappers to seek out
a reduced predator population or
wary specimen, before dishonest
and fraudulent practices creep
in to nullify any advantage gained.
However, there is one case where a
form of the bounty system appears to
have been successful. In a large area
of the U.S.S.R. centred around
Moscow, the wolf has been virtually
eliminated. The bounty paid per wolf
is equivalent to about four months'
wages for an agricultural worker.
This success appears to be due to
(a) the amount of enthusiasm that the
local population shows towards killing wolves and (b) the bonus system
—both factors being assisted strongly
by the social structure of the Soviet
Union (Bibikov pers. comm.).
Mech states that "when payments
are high, capture techniques efficient,
and the density of the species to be
bountied low, bounties may be
effective.
In certain areas, parti-

cularly on the edges of the wolf's
range or where the range is limited
the bounty could be a significant
factor in reducing a wolf population."
The Soviet Union experience would
seem to support this.
However the same large amount of
money is also paid in the Baltic
States, but the local Governments
have a different attitude towards the
wolf and, even though the law and
the bonus are the same as in the
Moscow region, a healthy wolf
population still survives. Possibly
the most important factor is the
social pressure exerted on the individual to believe that killing a wolf is
a good or bad thing.
It could therefore be concluded
that the bounty as such, despite
representing one third of a year's
salary, is not the reason for the wolf
population decline in the Moscow
region.
The Australasian experience
The course of bonus payments and
bounty systems in Australia has been
similar in all respects to the rest of
the world. It has not been possible to
find one documented case where a
bounty system has been successful.
"Many of the foxes killed by
man would have died anyway
due to natural causes"
The problem of fraud has been and
still is a major problem in Australia.
Victoria has a fox bonus and acknowledges that malpractices occur in
trafficking of scalps into the State
from nearby shires in New South
Wales and South Australia where no
fox bonus is paid.
In New Zealand there was a bonus
for possums, but this was stopped in
1961 when it was apparent that all
the bonus had achieved was to
spread the animals throughout New
Zealand(12).
There have also been reports of
dingo scalp movements between areas
in Western Australia where big differences exist in bonus payments.
They can vary from $2 to $20 in
adjoining shire areas and this is more
than enough to induce people to get
the higher rate by falsifying position
reports. There have been rumours
of people paying SI5 each for scalps

. . . would have died anyway, due to natural
causes.

in one shire and subsequently obtaining $20 each in a neighbouring shire.
In 1969, South Australia raised the
bonus it paid on dingo scalps from $2
to $4 and then to $6. At the same
time, Victoria, New South Wales,
Western Australia and Northern
Territory were paying $2. In that
year, the number of scalps handed in
for payment was 19 490—a considerable increase from the 3 000-odd
scalps of the year before. In 1970,
the bonus was lowered and reports
indicate that the scalp returns are
now back to the pre-1969 level.
This case illustrates very clearly
the basic problems of the bonus
system. Where did all those 19 490
scalps come from? It is a moot
point whether they resulted from
vastly increased hunting pressure on
the dingoes within South Australia or
as a result of a movement of scalps
across the borders.
It is also arguable that the bonus
was lowered because the campaign
was successful. The payments for
bonuses would have risen from
around $6 000 to $120 000. From
the arguments of Jacobsen and
Hamilton, this level would need to be
maintained for at least some years,
and probably should have been
increased considerably.
The places in Australia where
dingoes have been reduced in numbers are probably very similar to
those outlined above in the U.S.A.
where wolves and coyotes have been
reduced. When European man first
settled the continent, dingoes were
distributed throughout the mainland.
However, as land has been cleared
for agriculture and become more
densely settled, their range has been
reduced and their distribution has
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become patchy. The south-western
corner of Australia is now virtually
without dingoes.
However in the Murchison district
we find a case which meets the
criteria cited above by Mech where
bonuses will work: low dingo population level, easy access, enthusiastic
hunters and high bonus.
In the area around the town of
Cue, there are a number of large
sheep stations and dingoes are
extremely rare. However, if a dingo
is known to be in the area, a large
bounty is offered immediately and
the individual is removed fairly
quickly.
The bounty is from a
permanent fund that is maintained
for this reason.
The low dingo
density is probably due originally
to the accessibility of the country
leaving few dingo refuges available,
and to the almost total land use by
the station owners. It is kept low by
the very high bonus on the few
dingoes that occur. But even this
sort of scheme may be subject to
fraud.
Similar studies to those of Fairley,
although in less depth, have also
been carried out in Australia. Figure
1 shows the number of dingo scalps
submitted for payment in the Pilbara
district of Western Australia from
1962-75.
This shows that the
number has remained virtually constant despite fluctuations in bonus
payments. At the same time, evidence strongly suggests that the size
of the remaining population has not
decreased at all—in some areas it may
have increased.
Figure 2 shows
similar results in South Australia.
Tomlinson(13) plots figures for
dingoes, foxes, eagles and emus in
Western Australia (see Fig. 3) showing that for a period of nearly 30
years the number of bonuses paid on
these animals varied independently of
the size of the bonus. The annual
number of bounties paid for dingoes,
eagles and emus remained virtually
constant, while the number of bounties paid for foxes increased from
about 2 000 in 1928 to 45 000 in 1956.
The figures indicate that the bonus
has had no effect on reducing the
populations of these animals.
Also, as with wolves and foxes
cited above, the animals killed are
probably mainly those that would
have died anyway.
In Western
Australia, half of the dingoes caught
are less than one year old and 78 per

cent, are less than two years old—
the young and inexperienced animals that are most subject to natural
mortality.

bounty system must be counterproductive. As soon as a bounty
offered on a target animal is sufficiently large to warrant the effort
involved in claiming it, the incentive
is to get a "scalp" regardless of
whether the individual animal was
causing a problem or not. This
situation develops into a paradox, as,
more often than not, the high
population concentrations of the
target animal (and therefore the
most easy to catch) are not where the
animal is presenting a problem to
man.
The bonus system therefore tends
to force hunters to remove non-

Conclusions

So far, the discussion has centred
mainly around the concept that the
aim of a bonus system is to reduce a
target population and therefore alleviate whatever problem it may have
been causing, and this generally
seems to have been the aim with
most bounty systems.
However, if the aim is purely to
"alleviate the problem" then the
U00
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Fig. I—Dingo scalps submitted for bonus payments in the Pilbara region of W.A.
1962-1975.
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problem animals from areas of high
populations while the low population
concentrations are neglected and the
original problem caused by the
animal persists.

The final consideration of a bounty
system must be one of social benefit,
Gertsell(14) talked of the "widespread distribution of large sums of
money in the form of bounties", and
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concluded that this was an important
economic factor in rural North
America. He states that "payments
have often meant much to rural
families".
In Western Australia this is a
doubtful consideration as, in most
cases, the bounty payment per unit
animal is small. In places where it is
large, it is even more doubtful, as the
finance for these large payments is
raised in taxes from the "rural
families" themselves. If, therefore,
the aim of offering a large bounty
payment is to provide a form of rural
subsidy, the method of financing the
bonus payments, in Western Australia at least, would seem logically to
negate this aim.
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